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ABSTRACT 
 
Constructive trusts of disloyal fiduciary gain often are justified by the argument of 
deterrence. For there to be effective deterrence two conditions must be satisfied: first, 
potentially disloyal fiduciaries must be sufficiently informed, directly or indirectly, of the 
properties of the constructive trust; secondly, fiduciaries must respond by accurately 
weighing the costs/benefits of disloyalty and other options before choosing the option that 
maximises their self-interest. Typically one or both of these conditions will not be satisfied. 
Drawing upon insights from the behavioural sciences we find that fiduciaries contemplating 
disloyalty generally cannot be expected to be cognizant of the properties of the constructive 
trust therefore cannot be influenced by them. Even when known, such properties will not 
necessarily influence fiduciary behaviour due to the way well-informed fiduciaries are likely 
to perceive and process the risk their disloyalty will be detected. The deterrence gains 
generated by the recognition of a constructive trust therefore are likely to be negligible. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When a fiduciary’s gain neither is subtracted from nor intercepted on its way to the principal, the 
appropriateness of constructive trust relief generally is debated on the understanding that ‘the primary, 
if not the only, concern of the law.....is to deter deviation from duty’.1 Disagreement emerges not over 
whether the constructive trust generates extra deterrence – so much is assumed – but over whether the 
extra deterrence generated is sufficient to justify a proprietary response given the potential impact on 
innocent third parties, particularly the fiduciary’s unsecured creditors.2 
 
The deterrence thesis compliments the prophylactic theory of fiduciary obligation articulated by 
Conaglen.
3
 The prophylactic rationale posits that the strict obligation of loyalty seeks to make harm to 
the principal less likely by requiring the fiduciary to avoid situations in which such harm is more 
likely to occur. The fiduciary’s avoidance of situations in which harm is more likely to occur is 
secured by changing the fiduciary’s calculations of the costs and benefits of acting in those situations. 
Conaglen thus observes the function of a disgorgement remedy for breach of fiduciary obligation ‘is 
to deter fiduciaries from entering into such transactions in the first place, by seeking to remove any 
attraction that the transaction might hold’. 4 
   
The influence of deterrence thinking in extending the reach of the constructive trust is apparent in the 
cases. Decisions to recognise constructive trusts of bribes and secret commissions have been bolstered 
by reference to ‘powerful policy reasons’ for securing full disgorgement.5 And while a constructive 
trust was denied in Sinclair,
6
 Lord Neuberger MR, as he then was, accepted the recognition of a 
constructive trust turned on whether it was ‘the only way of ensuring that those with fiduciary duties 
were dissuaded from breaching their duties’.7 His Lordship expressed the tentative conclusion that a 
                                                          
* School of Law & Politics, The University of Hull. My thanks to Mike Varney and the anonymous referee for their 
penetrating and thought-provoking comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
1 Peter Watts, ‘Tyrrell v Bank of London: An Inside Look at an Inside Job’ (2013) 129 LQR 526, 531. See also Anthony 
Duggan, ‘Constructive Trusts From a Law and Economics Perspective’ (2005) 55 UTLJ 217, 229-230; A Duggan, ‘Gain-
Based Remedies and the Place of Deterrence in the Law of Fiduciary Obligations’ in Andrew Robertson & Hang Wu Tang 
(eds), The Goals of Private Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 365, 384; Emily Sherwin, ‘Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy’ 
[1989] U Ill L Rev 297, 337-339. In extra judicial writings the issue tends to be addressed, as one might expect, primarily as 
an issue of legal principle, although the deterrent function of the constructive trust is nonetheless acknowledged: see Sir 
Terrence Etherton, ‘The Legitimacy of Proprietary Relief’ (2014) 2 Birkbeck L Rev 59, 75; Sir Peter Millett, ‘Remedies: 
The Error in Lister & Co v Stubbs’ in Peter Birks (ed), Frontiers of Liability, vol 2 (OUP 1994) 51, 56. See also Lord Peter 
Millett, ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions Again’ [2012] CLJ 583, 590. 
2 Craig Rotherham, ‘Policy and Proprietary Remedies: Are We All Formalists Now?’ (2012) 65 CLP 529, 534. Compare 
Peter Watts, ‘Constructive Trusts and Insolvency’ (2009) 3 J Eq 250, 280 (upon bankruptcy the ‘deterrent purpose is spent’ 
and there may be a case for subordinating the principal’s claim to those of creditors who have suffered loss) and Anthony 
Duggan, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 1) 229-230, 247-248 (recognition of a constructive trust upon the fiduciary’s bankruptcy is 
efficient from an ex ante perspective). 
3 Matthew Conaglen, ‘The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty’ (2005) 121 LQR 452. On the difficulty of 
distinguishing prophylaxis and deterrence, see Lionel Smith, ‘Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary 
Obligation’ (2013) 7 J Eq 87. 
4 Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties (Hart Publishing 2010) 
80. 
5 Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd [2004] EWHC 622 (Ch), [2005] Ch 119 [86] (Collins J). See also 
Dyson Techology Ltd v Curtis [2010] EWHC 3289 (Ch), [189] (Grant J). 
6 Sinclair v Versailles Trade Finance (in administration) [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [2012] Ch 453. 
7 Sinclair (n 6) [53]. See also FHR European Ventures v Mankarious [2013] EWCA Civ 17, [2014] Ch 1 [116], where Sir 
Terrence Etherton C expressed the opinion that ‘deterring fraud and corruption’ is one of the ‘important issues of policy’ 
requiring consideration. 
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personal claim for an account of profits is sufficiently dissuasive.
8
 However, in FHR European 
Ventures a unanimous seven member panel of the Supreme Court, which included Lord Neuberger 
PSC, reached the opposite conclusion. Holding that a secret commission received by an agent was 
held on constructive trust for the principal, the panel emphasised (1) the social costs of bribery and 
secret commissions;
9
 (2) the importance of removing all of the defendant’s gains; and (3) the superior 
disgorgement potential of a proprietary claim over a personal claim.
10
 International and domestic 
measures to combat bribery and corruption,
11
 the panel noted, indicate concern over such activities 
‘has never been greater than it is now’ and suggest the civil law’s response should ‘be particularly 
stringent in relation to a claim against an agent who has received a bribe or secret commission’.12 
 
Elsewhere in the Commonwealth courts have been emphatic about the deterrent role of proprietary 
claims.
13
 In Lac Minerals, for example, La Forest J opined the essence of fiduciary duty ‘is its utility 
in the promotion and preservation of desired social behavior and institutions’14 and a constructive trust 
of fiduciary gain ‘acts as a deterrent to the breach of duty’.15 More recently, in Grimaldi the Full 
Court of the Federal Court of Australia reasoned that ‘[t]o exclude the bribed fiduciary from the 
deterrent effect of the constructive trust is.....to make it unavailable in the very situations where 
deterrence is likely to be the most needed’.16 In combating ‘the crudest form of fiduciary infidelity’, it 
continued, ‘the full range of equity’s remedies and techniques (including tracing and following illicit 
gains) are important instruments of deterrence.’17 
 
Of course, in Australia and Canada, unlike in England, the constructive trust is ‘remedial’ rather than 
‘institutional’ in nature.18 Consequently, it will not be imposed if other remedies are more 
appropriate.
19
 Potentially unfair effects, particularly on innocent third parties, therefore may be 
avoided or ameliorated. Deterrence nonetheless remains the driver of the constructive trust absent 
                                                          
8 Sinclair (n 6) [53], [90]. 
9 References to the objectionable nature of the activity might hint at a retributive motive for the recognition of a constructive 
trust. Indeed, appeals both to retributive and deterrent considerations are not uncommon in this context: see Soulos v 
Korkontzilas [1997] 2 SCR 217, 227 (SC, Can); American Law Institute, Restatement of Restitution (Third) §3 cmt a, §43 
cmts b & h (explaining disgorgement both in terms of retributive and prophylactic rationales). However, a retributive 
rationale requires a sanction to be proportionate to the gravity of the wrongdoing, as determined by such factors as the harm 
inflicted or risked and the wrongdoer’s motives. A retributive rationale therefore is incapable of justifying a constructive 
trust in many instances, as where the profiting fiduciary causes his principal no loss and acts in good faith – for instance, the 
receipt of the commission in Williams v Barton [1927] 2 Ch 9 (Ch) – or where the principal acts in what he reasonably 
considers is in his principal’s best interests, as in Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL). In such instances the 
disgorgement sanction ‘contains a penal element calculated to deter’: Boardman v Phipps [1965] Ch 992 (CA) 1031 
(Pearson LJ). 
10 FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45, [2015] AC 250 [1], [42], [44]. Similar 
points were made in Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330-331, 338. 
11 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 1999, which 
implemented calls ‘for effective measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials’ (Preamble); 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003, the main purpose of which is to ‘promote and strengthen measures to 
prevent and combat corruption’ (Art 1(a)); and the Bribery Act 2010, passed in response to concerns about the previously 
uncertain and fragmented legislative responses to bribery and to implement the UK’s international obligations to curb 
bribery and corruption: see Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (Law Com No 313, 2008) paras 1.1, 2.01-2.34. 
12 FHR European Ventures (n 10) [42]. 
13 In addition to the cases discussed, see also Lloyds Trust Company (Channel Islands) Ltd v Fragoso [2013] JRC 211 
(Jersey Royal Court), [28]; Sumitomo Bank Ltd v Thahir Kartik Ratna [1992] SLR (R) 638 (Sing HC) [216] (Lai Kew Chai 
J). 
14 Lac Minerals v International Corona Resources Ltd [1989] 2 SCR 574 (Can SC), 672. 
15 Lac Minerals (n 14) 673. See also Soulos (n 9) 235-236 (McLachlin J); Strother v 3464920 Canada Inc [2007] SCC 24, 
[2007] 2 SCR 177, [155]-[156] (McLachlin CJ). 
16 Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6, [576]. 
17 Grimaldi (n 16) [576]. 
18 See generally, Andrew Hicks, ‘Conceptualising the Constructive Trust’ (2005) 56 NILQ 521. For rejection of the remedial 
constructive trust in UK courts, see Re Polly Peck International plc (in administration) [1998] 3 All ER 812 (CA) 830-831 
(Nourse LJ); Compagnie Commerciale Andre SA v Artibell Shipping Company Ltd [2001] SC 653 (CSOH) [50] (Lord 
Macfadyen); Sinclair (n 6) [37]; Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, [2012] 2 All ER 754 [84] 
(Etherton LJ); Bailey v Angove’s Pty Ltd [2016] UKSC 47, [27]. 
19 Soulos (n 9); Farah Construction Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, [200]; John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v 
White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1, [126]-[128]; Grimaldi (n 16) [582]. 
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third party effects. Thus, in Grimaldi the Court expressed the opinion that, while a constructive trust 
of the proceeds of a profitably invested bribe will be denied where the fiduciary is insolvent,
20
 outside 
insolvency a constructive trust ‘is likely to be awarded as a matter of course’.21 To deny a constructive 
trust in such circumstances would ‘create an incentive which should not be tolerated’.22 
 
The basic premise of the deterrence thesis is that the constructive trust possesses superior 
disgorgement properties relative to an account of profits. Its recognition therefore reduces the 
expected benefit of, and incentive for, disloyal behaviour. This assumes two behavioural conditions 
are satisfied. First, fiduciaries perceive and understand the implications for them of the disgorgement 
properties of the constructive trust. Secondly, fiduciaries use this information to undertake a cost-
benefit analysis of disloyalty, and choose disloyalty only if it maximises their interests. That 
advocates of the deterrence thesis assume these conditions generally are satisfied is, perhaps, not 
surprising. The deterrence argument is economic in nature and classical economics – the brand of 
economics to which most people subscribe, even if only implicitly
23
 – assumes actors rationally 
maximise their own self-interest.
24
 Moreover, as one leading economist frankly concedes, ‘economic 
analysis of the behavioural effects of a legal rule generally begins with the assumption that the legal 
rule is clearly known not only to judges and other public officials but also to those subject to the legal 
rule’.25 
 
In recent years, however, mounting evidence from the behavioural sciences has shown that people’s 
behaviour frequently departs, in systematic and predictable ways, from that predicted by classical 
economics. Applying these insights this article finds that, far from being ‘important instruments of 
deterrence’,26 the constructive trust and associated doctrines such as tracing are likely to generate little 
additional deterrence. In practice, the assumptions underpinning the deterrence thesis do not hold: a 
fiduciary contemplating disloyalty is unlikely to be aware of the disgorgement properties of the 
constructive trust (whether directly or indirectly) and, in the unlikely event that he is, he is likely to 
underweight or ignore them. This is not to say that a constructive trust never can influence fiduciary 
behaviour, but the conditions under which it is likely to do so are atypical.  
 
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 identifies the marginal disgorgement benefits of the 
constructive trust, which are perhaps more modest than generally is assumed, and identifies the role of 
disgorgement in the standard economic theory of deterrence. Section 3 outlines key developments in 
the behavioural sciences which undermine the behavioural predictions of classical economics. 
Sections 4 and 5 develop these insights in greater detail. Section 4 identifies a number of biases which 
are likely to cause fiduciaries to perceive a low risk that disloyalty will be detected and explores the 
implications of low risk perception for deterrence. Section 5 examines the extent to which fiduciaries 
are likely to become informed about the legal consequences of disloyalty. It finds cognitive 
limitations, fiduciary information search strategies, and the external information environment will 
limit the fiduciary’s knowledge of of the legal implications of disloyalty. While we can expect 
fiduciaries to cognize the basic notion that disloyal gain must be ‘given up’, fiduciaries are unlikely to 
be cognizant of the more complex properties of disgorgement, such as how the gain will be identified 
or quantified. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 Grimaldi (n 16) [583] (noting a lien ‘may well be sufficient to achieve “practical justice” in the circumstances’).  
21 Grimaldi (n 16) [583]. 
22 Grimaldi (n 16) [576]. 
23 Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale University 
Press, 2008) 6 (noting that most people are committed to the idea that each of us ‘fits within the textbook picture of human 
beings offered by economists’). 
24 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Kluwer, 9th edn 2014) §1.1; Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and 
Economics (Berkeley Law Books, 6th edn 2016) 12-13. 
25 Louis Kornhauser, ‘The Economic Analysis of Law’ in Edward Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2016 edn) < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/legal-econanalysis/>.  
26 Grimaldi (n 16). 
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2. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND THE ECONOMICS OF DETERRENCE 
 
(a) The Marginal Disgorgement Benefits of the Constructive Trust 
 
The perceived importance of the constructive trust in deterring disloyalty rests on its superior 
disgorgement properties relative to a personal claim for an account of profits. As Duggan explains, 
‘[f]or effective deterrence the remedy must capture all D’s gains from the wrongdoing’ and ‘[t]he only 
sure-fire way of extracting all D’s gains is to impose a constructive trust’.27 As will be discussed 
below, this perhaps overstate the point a little. Nevertheless, a constructive trust may enhance 
disgorgement as a result of three proprietary aspects: (1) the principal’s power to invoke the tracing 
process; (2) the principal’s power to call for the trust property to be transferred in specie; and (3) the 
enforcement advantages that follow from the recognition of a proprietary claim. 
 
(i) Tracing 
 
A constructive trust provides a gateway to the tracing process, which allows the principal to recover 
secondary profits derived from the investment of the initial gain.
28
 By contrast, it sometimes is 
assumed that an account of profits will not reach beyond the value of the gain initially received in 
breach of fiduciary obligation.
29
 For some, any extension of personal rights and remedies to capture 
secondary profits risks blurring important conceptual boundaries that should remain clearly 
delineated.
30
 
 
Tracing is not, however, designed to effect disgorgement of wrongful gain.
31
 To effect perfect 
disgorgement a wrongdoer must be stripped of all of the wealth he would not have acquired ‘but for’ 
the wrong. Tracing tends to involve transactional rather than causal inquiries. Penner makes the point 
neatly: ‘tracing tracks the transactions a person makes with the property rights at his disposal; it does 
not track increases in wealth that are causally dependent on prior increases in wealth’.32 Since it is 
possible to generate wealth by utilising an initial gain without leaving a transactional trail, claims 
against traceable proceeds ‘are not in any way a substitute for gain stripping as a matter of principle, 
and they are a very poor facsimile in practice’.33 
 
It is, moreover, incorrect to assume that a purely personal disgorgement claim that reaches secondary 
profits cannot be developed. An account of profits functions to identify the profit made by a 
wrongdoer as a result of the commission of a wrong. The value of wrongfully acquired profit is 
identified by a ‘but for’ test of causation subject to an appropriate remoteness principle.34 Usually the 
remoteness principle limits recovery to benefits arising directly from the commission of a wrong, but 
in the context of a profiting fiduciary the principle must be weaker and permit recovery of profits 
                                                          
27 Duggan, ‘Constructive Trusts’ (n 1) 229. 
28 FHR (n 10) [1], [44]; Reid (n 10) 331, 336; Lord Peter Millett, ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions’ (n 1) 590. 
29 Reid (n 10) 336; Lord Millett, ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions’ (n 1) 590; Roy Goode, ‘Proprietary Liability for Secret 
Profits – A Reply’ (2011) 127 LQR 493, 495. The view derives some support from the comments of Lindley LJ in Lister & 
Co v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1 (CA) 15 (rejecting the notion that an agent in receipt of a secret commission might be 
compelled to account ‘for all the profits which he might have made by embarking in trade with it’ since this would confound 
ownership with obligation). The view of Lindley LJ has been long supported by Goode: see Roy Goode, ‘Property and 
Unjust Enrichment’ in Andrew Burrows (ed), Essays on the Law of Restitution (1991) 215, 242 (noting Lister was correctly 
decided because it does not ‘allow P to recover by way of personal action a sum measured as if his claim did have a 
proprietary base’). See also Roy Goode, ‘Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions’ (1987) 103 LQR 433, 441-
444. The perceived limitation of a personal claim may explain why a declaration of constructive trust was sought in 
Boardman (n 9): see Andrew Hicks, ‘Proprietary Relief in Boardman v Phipps’ (2014) 65 NILQ 1, 10-12. 
30 Lister (n 29); Goode, ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment’ (n 29). 
31 See Sarah Worthington, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies: Addressing the Failure of Equitable Formulae’ 
(2013) 72 CLJ 720, 740-742. 
32 James Penner, ‘The Difficult Doctrinal Basis for the Fiduciary’s Proprietary Liability to Account for Bribes’ (2012) 18 T 
& T 1000, 1006. 
33 Penner (n 32) 1006. 
34 Graham Virgo, ‘Restitutionary Remedies for Wrongs: Causation and Remoteness’ in Charles Rickett (ed), Justifying 
Private Law Remedies (Hart Publishing 2008) 301, 307-310.  
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arising indirectly from the breach, from the application of the initial gain.
35
 If the driver of doctrine in 
this area is deterrence, and if deterrence makes it imperative to strip a fiduciary of all gains 
attributable to a breach of fiduciary obligation, relaxation of the usual remoteness rules to capture ‘but 
for’ wealth is both logical and necessary. Moreover, a causal inquiry coupled with an appropriate 
remoteness rule would be a more principled method of measuring the fiduciary’s gain than 
transactional link tracing. It also would have the advantage of being less disruptive to third parties 
than a proprietary claim.
36
  
 
Indeed, such a flexible personal disgorgement remedy may exist already. In Sinclair Lord Neuberger 
MR expressed the view, albeit tentatively, that a purely personal disgorgement claim is ‘sufficiently 
flexible’ to allow recovery of gains causally linked to a breach of fiduciary obligation.37 The object of 
an account in this context, as Morritt LJ emphasised in Deutsche Bank, ‘is to ensure that the 
defaulting fiduciary does not retain the profit’.38  More recently, the Court of Appeal emphasised the 
flexibility of an account when accepting that an accessory will be liable to disgorge  profits flowing 
from dishonestly assisting in a breach of fiduciary obligation so long as there is a ‘sufficiently direct 
causal connection’ between the profits and the underlying wrong.39 
 
(ii) The Transfer Advantage 
 
Proponents of the deterrence rationale also point to a cluster of disgorgement benefits generated by 
the constructive trust claimant’s power to seek the delivery-up or conveyance of the property subject 
to the constructive trust. Where the gain or its traceable substitute is non-fungible the transfer of the 
asset eliminates the risk that the fiduciary will benefit from post-judgment increases in the value of 
the asset.
40
 It also avoids the risk of inadequate disgorgement resulting from valuation mistakes.
41
 
Finally, the transfer of the asset to the principal avoids the risk that the fiduciary will retain a 
consumer surplus because he values the asset more than the market-based measure of a personal 
disgorgement claim (the problem of ‘subjective valuation’).42 
 
Delivery-up or conveyance of the fiduciary’s gain does not, however, follow automatically from the 
recognition of a constructive trust but is contingent on the claimant’s election. Whether the claimant 
elects to have the property transferred will depend on whether its transfer is more advantageous to the 
claimant than an alternative available remedy, not on whether the property is particularly valuable to 
the defendant.
43
 Moreover, from a general deterrence perspective valuation mistakes are a concern 
only if there is systematic under-valuation of gains. Absent evidence of systematically skewed 
                                                          
35 Virgo (n 34) 321-322. See also James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property 
(Hart Publishing 2002) 108-109; William Swadling, ‘Constructive Trusts and Breach of Fiduciary Duty’ (2012) 18 T & T 
985, 992; Charles Mitchell, David Hayton & Paul Matthews, Underhill & Hayton: Law of Trusts and Trustees (Lexis-Nexis 
19th edn, 2016) para 27.32. 
36 Sinclair (n 6) [90] (Lord Neuberger MR). 
37 Sinclair (n 6) [53], [90]. Whether the obiter survives FHR (n 10) may be doubted by some. In Sinclair Lord Neuberger 
MR reasoned that, if he was correct on the issue, ‘it undermines the main policy reason supporting [a] proprietary claim: it 
does not matter to the defaulting fiduciary if he is stripped of his profits because they are beneficially owned by the 
beneficiary, or because he has to account for those profits to the beneficiary.’ However, in FHR the Supreme Court appeared 
to accept that deterrence demanded a constructive trust of the fiduciary’s gain: see above n 9 – n 12 and text. In FHR, 
however, the constructive trust was important primarily for reasons of enforcement: see below n 45 – n 46 and text. 
38 United Pan Europe Communications NV v Deutsche Bank AG [2000] 2 BCLC 461, [47].  
39 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhayluk [2014] EWCA Civ 908, [2014] QB 499. 
40 Duggan, ‘Constrictive trusts’ (n 1) 229. 
41 Mistakes may occur because the property is unique and the absence of a suitable comparator makes valuation difficult or 
because the value of the gain turns on unpredictable future variables, a particular problem with some business opportunities: 
see Lac Minerals v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14 (Can SC) 48-49 (La Forest J). 
42 Duggan, ‘Constrictive trusts’ (n 1) 229; Sherwin (n 1) 338. 
43 It is true, as the anonymous reviewer of this article noted, that the availability of a specific remedy, not its inevitable 
enforcement, may have deterrent value. Indeed, it may be that cases in which a gain is valued subjectively by the defaulting 
fiduciary but not claimed in specie by the principal will be relatively few. But from an economic perspective so long as a 
fiduciary can expect to retain a consumer surplus in some cases, however few in unmber, he will discount the expected costs 
of the remedy accordingly. See further the discussion of the neo-classical economic theory of deterrence below, n 55 – n 56 
and text. 
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valuation we might expect a relatively even distribution of mistakes that are off-setting. It is also 
worthy of note that the risk a fiduciary may benefit from post-judgment increases in the value of an 
asset is ameliorated by the claimant’s power to elect to postpone the taking of an account of profits 
until such time as the value of the gain becomes clear.
44
  
 
(iii) Enforcement Advantages 
 
As a consequence of the recourse it provides to third parties, a constructive trust may be particularly 
effective at cutting off avenues for processing ill-gotten gains. Corrupt fiduciaries in particular might 
transfer their ill-gotten gains to compliant third parties, leaving themselves with insufficient assets to 
meet any judgment entered against them. However, assets subject to a constructive trust can be 
followed into the hands of recipients and recovered, unless the recipient is a bona fide purchaser of 
the legal title without notice. The FHR case
45
 illustrates the point. The €10m secret commission was 
received by Cedar LLC in breach of fiduciary obligation and mixed in its bank accounts with other 
monies. Transfers equivalent to the value of the commission then were made to Cedar Ltd (a wholly 
owned subsidiary) and to Mr Mankarious, the moving force behind both companies who used the 
monies to fund, amongst other things, the purchase of life insurance policies and freehold property. 
Cedar LLC was left with no assets to satisfy a claim for breach of fiduciary obligation. A proprietary 
claim allowed the claimants to follow and trace the commission and recover proceeds from Cedar Ltd 
and Mr Mankarious.
46
 
 
In contrast to proprietary rights, personal rights receive less protection against interference by third 
parties. A third party who becomes involved in a breach of fiduciary obligation may face accessory 
liability for inducing, encouraging or assisting in the breach. The accessory will be jointly and 
severally liable with the fiduciary to compensate the principal for the loss resulting from the breach of 
fiduciary duty
47
 or, alternatively, liable to account for any profits resulting from the assistance.
48
 
However, since higher fault and involvement thresholds are required
49
 a principal without a 
proprietary claim may be left with no effective redress against a culpable third party.
50
 A significant 
advantage of the constructive trust is that volunteer recipients of the fiduciary’s gain are bound 
automatically by the trust claim.
51
 
 
Corrupt fiduciaries are also likely candidates to abscond. The recognition of a constructive trust has 
incidental benefits in this regard since more options tend to be available to prevent defendants from 
dealing in identified assets if the claimant is able to demonstrate a proprietary interest. This was one 
important reason for the proprietary claim in Reid:
52
 recognition of a constructive trust allowed the 
registration of caveats against the New Zealand properties allegedly purchased with the bribe monies, 
frustrating Reid’s hope that the properties could be ‘sold and the proceeds whisked away to some 
Shangri La which hides bribes and other corrupt moneys in numbered bank accounts’.53 The absence 
                                                          
44 Crown Dilmun v Sutton [2004] EWHC 52 (Ch), [2004] 1 BCLC 468 [205]-[214] (Peter Smith J) (claimant permitted to 
postpone the taking of the account until the value of the wrongfully exploited opportunity became clear).   
45 FHR (n 10). 
46 See FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2016] EWHC 359 (Ch) (Master Clark). 
47 Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch), [2006] FSR 16, [1600] (Lewison J). 
48 Novoship (n 39). 
49 Watts, ‘Inside Look’ (n 1) 530. 
50 A claim for accessory liability would, however, seem relatively straightforward in cases replicating the FHR fact pattern 
(above n 45 – n 46 and text).  
51 Additionally, a constructive trust of the gain may extend accessory liability to those who assist the fiduciary in dealings 
with the gain but who did not assist in the wrongdoing that generated the gain: see, for example, the unsuccessful claim in 
Fitzalen-Howard v Hibbert [2009] EWHC 2855 (QB), [2010] PNLR 11. 
52 Reid (n 10). For a more detailed account of the important procedural advantages secured by a proprietary claim in the case, 
see Richard Nolan, ‘The Wages of Sin: Iniquity in Equity Following A-G for Hong Kong v Reid’ (1994) Comp Law 3, 4-5 
but especially footnote 15. 
53 Reid (n 10) 339. 
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of a proprietary claim does not, however, necessarily leave a principal without any power to encumber 
the assets in the hands of a fiduciary.
54
 
 
 
(b) Neo-Classical Economic Theory of Deterrence 
 
To the extent the constructive trust has superior disgorgement properties relative to an account of 
profits, neo-classical economic theory provides a short link to the conclusion that a constructive trust 
of fiduciary gain enhances deterrence.  
 
Neo-classical economic theory views deterrence as nothing more than an application of the general 
theory of rational choice under uncertainty.
55
 Individuals are assumed to be rational utility maximizers 
who calculate the probable returns of all available options open to them and pursue the option that 
gives the greatest return. Thus, rational actors will be deterred from wrongdoing if the expected utility 
of the commission of a wrong is less than the expected utility of an alternative option. The expected 
utility of wrongdoing can be reduced by increasing the expected cost of the wrongdoing. The 
expected cost of wrongdoing is a product of two variables: the objective probability that wrongdoing 
will be detected and sanctioned (p) multiplied by the sanction (s). It follows that, all other things being 
equal, the expected cost of wrongdoing can be raised by increasing either p or s, and different 
combinations of p and s can achieve the same sanction effect: a fall in p can be off-set by a 
compensating uplift in s and vice-versa.
56
 
 
According to this model, the mere requirement that a wrongdoer give up his gain whenever caught 
will have little dissuasive effect unless detection and enforcement rates are perfect.
57
 Since they are 
not, disgorgement per se is a poor deterrent because it leaves wrongdoing profitable on average.
58
 
However, there likely will be other formal and informal elements of a sanction, in addition to 
disgorgement, which a rational wrongdoer will factor in to their calculation of the expected cost of 
wrongdoing. In the fiduciary context, these include:  (1) termination or non-renewal of the 
relationship; (2) firm-level sanctions, such as organisational censure, limited promotion prospects or 
dismissal;
59
 (3) professional embarrassment, negative peer perception or loss of reputation;
60
 and (4) 
criminal sanctions.
61
  
 
If a constructive trust removes more from a fiduciary than an account of profits its recognition will, in 
combination with other sanction elements, increase the total value of s and thereby raise the expected 
cost of disloyalty. By raising the expected cost of disloyalty, fewer opportunities for wrongdoing will 
yield an expected net benefit in excess of the expected net benefit of legitimate options, resulting in 
less wrongdoing. 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Freezing orders are available to prevent the disposal of assets with the intention of defeating judgment and, in some 
jurisdictions, pre-judgment charging orders and caveats against dealings in land are available without a proprietary interest in 
the relevant land: Watts, ‘Constructive Trusts and Insolvency’ (n 2) 283.  
55 Gary Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76 J Pol Econ 167. 
56 Thus, if an expected sanction of £50 is required to deter, and detection and sanctioning of wrongdoing falls from one in 
two to one in four, the desired level of deterrence can be preserved by increasing the sanction from £100 (0.5 x £100=£50) to 
£200 (0.25 x £200=£50): A Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (Little Brown 2nd edn, 1989) 77-78. 
57 Hence theft cannot be deterred merely by requiring a thief to return stolen property if caught: Cooter & Ulen (n 24) 562.  
58 Smith (n 3); Lionel Smith, ‘Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgment on Behalf of Another’ 
(2014) 130 LQR 608, 627. 
59 As to the powerful influence of such sanctions, see Richard Hollinger & John Clark, ‘Formal and Informal Social Controls 
of Employee Deviance’ (1982) 23 Sociological Quarterly 333. 
60 For professional fiduciaries a reputation for honesty and loyalty may be as important as a brand name is to a manufacturer: 
Tamar Frankel, ‘Fiduciary Law’ (1983) 71 Calif L Rev 795, 835-836; Kenneth Davis, ‘Judicial Review of Fiduciary 
Decisionmaking – Some Theoretical Perspectives’ (1985) 80 Nw U L Rev 1, 8. 
61 For instance, the receipt of a bribe is punishable by a maximum of ten years imprisonment, an unlimited fine, or both: 
Bribery Act 2010, s 11(1). 
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3. THE BEHAVIOURAL CHALLENGE TO RATIONAL CHOICE ECONOMICS 
 
The deterrence thesis follows neo-classical economics in its assumptions about how fiduciaries 
identify and perceive risk and how they obtain and process information.  However, behavioural 
scientists have shown that in some contexts the traditional economic account of human behaviour not 
only fails to describe accurately the psychological processes by which humans make decisions, it also 
lacks predictive power. These insights generally are collected together under the label ‘behavioural 
economics’.62 Behavioural economics attempts ‘to increase the explanatory and predictive power of 
economic theory by providing it with more psychologically plausible foundations’.63 The field has 
two distinguishing characteristics. First, it focuses on identifying the systematic and predictable ways 
in which the behaviour of agents deviates from that predicted by rational choice theory. Secondly, it is 
empirical in nature in that it looks for evidence about how actors really do behave. 
 
 
(a) Systematic and Predictable Deviations From Rationality 
 
Sometimes, people do not aspire to make optimal decisions because it is not feasible given the 
constraints under which they operate. Long ago Herbert Simon provided the influential insight that the 
capacity of humans to make rational decisions is curtailed by limited information, limited time, and 
limited computational capacity. Simon coined the term ‘bounded rationality’ to capture this insight 
and offered a model of decision-making in which utility maximisation is replaced with ‘satisficing’, 
the idea that in many contexts individuals in fact aim to make decisions which are approximate and 
satisfactory rather than optimal.
64
 For instance, when considering how informed individuals are likely 
to be in a given situation, satisficing provides a more plausible model than the assumption that actors 
are perfectly informed or will search for an optimal amount of information.
65
 
 
Building on Simon’s insights psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky discovered non-
optimal decisions also may be the unintended consequence of the operation of heuristics and 
associated judgment biases.
66
 Heuristics are simplifying shortcuts of intuitive thinking, cognitive 
‘rules of thumb’, which reduce the complexity of a task. Heuristics generally are ‘highly economical 
and usually effective’.67 But they also come with characteristic biases which arise in certain, 
predictable situations. For example, estimates of the probability of an event typically are mediated by 
an assessment of its ‘availability’ - ‘the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to 
mind’.68 Usually, availability is a good indicator of event probability since common events tend to 
come to mind with greater ease than rare events. However, since factors other than general frequency 
affect ease of recall – for instance, the vividness of an event – reliance on availability can produce 
errors.
69
 
 
                                                          
62 For an accessible history, see Richard Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics (Allen Lane 2015). 
63 Erik Angner & George Loewenstein, ‘Behavioral Economics’ in Uskali Maki (ed), Handbook of the Philosophy of 
Science: Philosophy of Economics (Elsvier 2012) 641, 642. 
64 Herbert A Simon, ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’ (1955) 69 Q J Econ 99; Herbert A Simon, ‘Information 
Processing Models of Cognition’ (1979) 30 Annual Review of Psychology 363. See generally, Peter Earl (ed), The Legacy of 
Herbert Simon in Economic Analysis, vol 1 (Edward Elgar 2001). 
65 See Section 5, below. 
66 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk’ (1979) 47 Econometrica 
313; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ in Amos Tversky, Daniel 
Kahneman & Paul Slovic (eds), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge University Press 1982) 3; 
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, ‘On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions’ (1996) 103 Psychol Rev 582.  
67 Tversky & Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty’ (n 66) 20. See generally, Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter Todd & ABC 
Research Group, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (OUP 2000). 
68 Tversky & Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty’ (n 66) 11. See generally, Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and 
Slow (Penguin Books 2012) 129-145; Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (Temple university 
Press, 1993) 121-130. 
69 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, ‘Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability’ (1973) 5 Cognitive 
Psychology 207, 209. 
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A crucial finding of the heuristics and biases research project is that heuristics misfire in predictable 
ways. In the years following Kahneman & Tversky’s pioneering studies, psychologists devised 
numerous experiments to identify and map the operation of heuristics and their associated biases. This 
research produced ‘a taxonomy of deviations from rationality’70 – an outline of the predictable ways 
in which decision-makers deviate from the rationality assumptions of traditional economics.
71
 It 
provides a ‘more subtle, textured understanding of how actors make decisions in various situations’ 
by providing a ‘pragmatic collection of situation-specific insights’ that can be applied to ‘modify the 
implausible elements of rational choice theory and supplement the inadequate elements in order to 
create a tool with more predictive power in specific situations’. 72  
 
 
(b) Empirical Foundations of the Behavioural Claims 
 
The claims of behavioural economics are empirical in the sense they are informed by scientific 
insights about actual human behaviour. Although field studies increasingly are employed to gather 
data, behavioural economics insights predominantly are derived from laboratory experiments. There 
are legitimate concerns that insights from laboratory experiments are not capable of easy or reliable 
generalisation.
73
 One concern is that experimental settings involve small stakes therefore may lack 
incentives that cure real-world actors of their biases. However, there is little evidence that increased 
incentives have the curative effect claimed and some evidence that incentives can in fact exacerbate 
biases.
74
  A more serious concern is that experimental settings typically do not provide opportunities 
for individuals to learn to adapt to eliminate biases.
75 
Learning opportunities do not, however, 
diminish all biases.
76
 Moreover, in some contexts there will be impediments to learning – for instance, 
because feedback on choices is too infrequent.
77
 Biases affecting the judgment of fiduciaries 
contemplating disloyal acts, for example, are unlikely to be corrected because feedback is most likely 
when wrongdoing is detected and this is likely to be infrequently. Finally, there is concern that many 
of the identified biases pull in opposite directions hence their net effect on behaviour outside of the 
controlled laboratory environment may be ambiguous.
78
 While this is true, not all real world situations 
arguably trigger opposing biases. The multiple biases affecting fiduciary perceptions of the risk of 
detection, for example, are unidirectional, hence cumulative – not conflicting – in effect. Thus, while 
behavioural economics may be too underdeveloped to be a comprehensive tool of legal analysis, its 
findings can prove insightful in particular contexts. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 Herbert A Simon, ‘The Behavioral and Social Sciences’ (1980) 209 Science 72, 75. 
71 As to which, see Daniel Kahneman, ‘Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics’ (2003) 93 Am 
Econ Rev 1449; Robyn LeBoeuf & Elder Shafir, ‘Decision Making’ in Keith Holyoak & Robert Morrison (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning (OUP 2012) 301. 
72 Russell Korobkin & Tom Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics’ (2000) 88 Cal L Rev 1051, 1074-1075. See also  Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein  & Richard Thaler, ‘A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1487. 
73 Richard A Posner, ‘Behavioral Law and Economics: A Critique’ (2002) 42 Economic Education Bulletin 1, 3; Yulie Foka-
Kavalieraki & Aristides Hatzis, ‘Rational After All: Toward an Improved Theory of Rationality in Economics’ (2011) 12 
Revue de Philosophie Economique 3, 20-21. 
74 Eldar Shafir & Robyn LeBoeuf, ‘Rationality’ (2002) 53 Annual Review of Psychology 491, 501-502; Jeffrey Rachlinski, 
‘The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism’ (2002-2003) 97 Nw U L Rev 1165, 1167. 
75 For instance, it appears that the endowment effect, the tendency to place a higher value on something simply because it is 
owned, is eroded as individuals gain experience of trading in goods: John List, ‘Does Market Experience Eliminate Market 
Anomalies?’ (2003) 118 Q J Econ 41; John List, ‘Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the 
Marketplace’ (2004) 72 Economtrica 615. 
76 Shafir & LeBoeuf (n 74) 502 
77 Rachlinski (n 74) 1220-1224. 
78 Roger van den Bergh, ‘Behavioral Antitrust: Not Ready for the Main Stage’ (2013) 9 J Competition Law & Economics 
203, 211, 214-216; Doron Teichman, ‘The Optimism Bias of the Behavioral Analysis of Crime Control’ [2011] U Ill L Rev 
1697. 
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4. THE FIDUCIARY’S PERCEPTION OF DETECTION RISK 
 
The actual detection and enforcement probability (p) is central to the neo-classical economic theory of 
deterrence. The value of p will vary, but generally can be expected to be relatively low. Fiduciary 
law’s ‘no further inquiry rule’ is designed to raise the value of p,79 but enforcement is premised on 
detection and in many instances, particularly those involving the receipt of bribes and commissions, 
the actual probability of detection will be small. The issue for conventional economic analysis is 
whether s is sufficient to compensate for a low p. However, from a behavioural perspective it is not 
the actual but the perceived probability of detection and enforcement that is important for deterrence. 
Perceived probability of detection may diverge significantly from the actual value of p. Moreover, 
while conventional economic analysis assumes a linear weighting of risk the behavioural evidence 
suggests otherwise. In particular, it suggests people have difficulties dealing with small risks and may 
ignore them altogether. This section identifies the causes of low risk perception, examines how these 
might affect fiduciaries, and considers the implications of low risk perception for deterring disloyalty. 
   
 
(a) Causes of Low Risk Perception 
 
A fiduciary will not possess actuarial information about detection rates for disloyal acts. An 
assessment of the risk of detection therefore will be inferential, drawn from past experience and the 
fiduciary’s observations of the risk. This process opens the door for the operation of biases which may 
lead to the systematic underestimation of p. 
 
(i) Availability Bias 
 
In the absence of statistical information, the subjectively perceived likelihood of an event typically is 
mediated by its ‘availability’ – the ease and speed with which the event can be remembered or 
imagined.
80
 However, factors unrelated to the frequency or probability of an event may influence 
availability and generate bias. Much of the research on ‘availability’ emphasises a positive correlation 
between salience and availability. For instance, witnessing a house fire will have a greater impact on 
one’s perceived risk of house fires than reading about the same fire in a newspaper due to the 
vividness of physically proximate events which makes them more memorable.
81
 Vivid information is 
more available than ‘pallid, abstract or statistical information’.82 Equally, recent events usually are 
more available than earlier ones.
83
 ‘Imaginability’ also influences availability.84 When scenarios that 
lead to an event are difficult to imagine, or if no plausible scenario comes to mind, the event tends to 
be perceived as improbable; if plausible scenarios, or a particularly compelling scenario, can be 
constructed with ease the event tends to be perceived as probable.
85
 
 
(ii) Optimism Bias 
 
Availability biases often are compounded by the operation of self-serving biases, a loose collection of 
biases ‘driven by a common human tendency to interpret the world to make it square more 
comfortably with one’s own interests and beliefs.’86 Thus, individuals tend to ascribe too much weight 
                                                          
79 Robert Cooter & Bradley Freedman, ‘The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences’ 
(1991) 66 NYUL Rev 1045, 1051-1056. 
80 See the sources cited in n 68 and n 69. 
81 Tversky & Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty’ (n 66) 11. 
82 Plous (n 68) 126. 
83 Sunstein & Thaler (n 23) 36. 
84 Tversky & Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty’ (n 66) 12.  
85 See Steven Sherman and others, ‘Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: 
The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery’ in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Khaneman (eds), Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of intuitive Judgment (Cambridge University Press 2002) 98. 
86 Ward Farnsworth, ‘The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias’ (2003) 37 UC Davis L Rev 567, 570. 
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to the contributions they make to particular outcomes (ego-centric bias);
87
 have excessive confidence 
in their own forecasts (over-confidence bias);
88
 and believe their own risk of experiencing a negative 
outcome is lower than it actually is (optimism bias).
89
 Optimism bias is particularly important given 
its powerful effects and pervasiveness.
90
 As two leading commentators note, the bias ‘is an 
indiscriminate and indefatigable cognitive feature’ that causes individuals to ‘underestimate the extent 
to which a threat applies to them even when they can recognize the severity it poses to others’.91 From 
a wrongdoer’s perspective, detection of wrongdoing is a negative event. Evidence suggests over-
optimism operates in this domain: people tend to believe their own wrongdoing is less likely to be 
detected than the wrongdoing of others.
92
 This is particularly likely if a wrongdoer perceives measures 
to evade detection are within his control. A consistent and robust finding in studies of optimism bias 
is the existence of a positive correlation between perceptions of control (in the form of steps that can 
be taken to avoid a negative outcome) and unrealistic optimism about avoiding the outcome.
93
 
 
 
 (iii) Biased Perceptions of the Level of Wrongdoing 
 
There is plenty of evidence that people assume others engage in unethical and morally undesirable 
behaviour more often than they do.
94
 A particularly relevant example is bribery. Although actual 
incidents of bribery may be relatively low,
95
 recent data suggests a majority of people perceive bribery 
is widespread (64%)
96
 and an accepted part of UK business culture (62%).
97
 One possible explanation 
for misperceptions about the level of wrongdoing is that they result from the ‘false uniqueness effect’, 
the tendency of people to under-estimate the extent to which others share their positive attributes.
98
 
The implication of this bias is that ‘those who perform a desirable behaviour underestimate the 
number of others as good as them, whereas those who perform an undesirable behaviour overestimate 
the number of others as bad as them’.99 Misperceptions about others’ conduct also may be generated 
by the ‘false consensus effect’, the tendency of people to over-estimate the degree to which others 
                                                          
87 Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, ‘Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution’ in Tversky, Kahneman & Slovic (n 66) 
179. 
88 Rachlinski (n 74) 1172. 
89 Neil Weinstein, ‘Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events’ (1980) 39 J Personality & Social Psychology 806. For a 
summary of the vast psychological literature on the bias, see James Sheppherd and others, ‘A Primer on Unrealistic 
Optimism’ (2015) 24 Current Directions in Psychological Science 232. 
90 See Christine Jolls, ‘On Law Enforcement With Boundedly Rational Actors’ in Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith (eds), 
The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior (Stanford University Press 2005) 268, 270, 273 (finding more than 250 
studies documenting this ‘highly robust feature of human behaviour’). See also Sheppherd and others (n 89). 
91 Jon Hanson & Douglas Kysar, ‘Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation’ (1999) 74 NYUL 
Rev 630, 657-658. See also Tim Smits & Vera Hoorens, ‘How Probable is Probably? It Depends on Whom You’re Talking 
About’ (2005) 18 Journal of Hehavioral Decision Making 83 (finding information about the probability of future events is 
often interpreted in a self-serving way). 
92 Andrew Guppy, ‘Subjective Probability of Accident and Apprehension in Relation to Self-Other Bias, Age, and Reported 
Behavior’ (1993) 25 Accident Analysis & Prevention 375, 377-380 (most drivers believe they have a better than average 
chance of avoiding detection for driving while over the prescribed blood alcohol limit). See also Jolls (n 90) 273-274. 
93 Peter Harris, ‘Sufficient Grounds for Optimism? The Relationship Between Perceived Controllability and Optimistic Bias’ 
(1996) 15 J Social & Clinical Psychology 9; Cynthia Klein & Marie Helweg-Larsen, ‘Perceived Control and the Optimistic 
Bias: A Meta-Analytic Review’ (2002) 17 Psychology & Health 437. 
94 For discussion of relevant studies, see Robert Cooter, Michal Feldman & Yuval Feldman, ‘The Misperception of Norms: 
The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium’ (2008) 4 Rev L & Econ 889, 893-895. 
95 Survey data collected in one notable study suggests actual instances of bribery in the UK are ‘negligible’: Transparency 
International, Corruption in the UK: Part One (2010) 4. A more recent survey found 7% of UK respondents admitted to 
knowing people who have taken or take bribes: European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 397: Corruption (2014) 70. 
Corruption is more prevalent in some sectors than others – for instance, the construction indistry: see Chartered Institute of 
Building, Corruption in the UK Construction Industry (London: 2013) p 15 (35% of respondents in the construction industry 
had been offered a bribe at least once in their career). 
96 European Commission, Eurobarometer (n 95) 20. 
97 European Commission, Eurobarometer (n 95) 54.  
98 On the cognitive and motivational causes of this bias, see Cooter, Feldman & Feldman (n 94) 895-898. 
99 Benoit Monin & Micael Norton, ‘Perceptions of a Fluid Consensus: Uniqueness Bias, False Consensus, False Polarization, 
and Pluralistic Ignorance in a Water Conservation Crisis’ (2003) 29 Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin 559, 560. 
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share their beliefs, attributes and behaviours.
100
 A consequence of this bias is that a person inclined to 
undesirable behaviour is likely to over-estimate how many others engage in similar behaviour.
101
  
 
Over-estimation of the frequency with which others violate norms may have important implications 
for perceptions about the risk of detection for a norm’s violation. If violations are perceived as more 
prevalent than they are, but incidents of detection are not, the risk of getting caught is likely to be 
underestimated. 
 
 
(b) The Fiduciary’s Perceptions of Detection Risk 
 
Fiduciaries no doubt are likely to be susceptible to such biases when determining the risk that 
contemplated disloyalty will be detected. Consider first the general characteristics of fiduciary 
relationships. Most analyses of fiduciary relationships emphasise the asymmetric distribution of 
information between the parties, the fiduciary’s physical or practical control over the enterprise, and 
the monitoring difficulties faced by the principal.
102
 These structural characteristics create numerous 
opportunities for the fiduciary to render breaches undetectable and no doubt engender feelings of 
power and control. Given the correlation between perceptions of control and over-optimism, we might 
expect the very nature of the fiduciary relationship to tend to bias fiduciary perceptions about the 
prospects of avoiding detection of wrongdoing.  
 
More specifically, consider fiduciary appropriations of opportunities. Some appropriations may be 
difficult to conceal. Where a fiduciary intercepts a maturing business opportunity, for example, the 
principal or other monitors may be put on notice by the non-arrival of an expected benefit. Similarly, 
when a fiduciary engages in competition with his principal the principal may be put on notice by the 
unexplained erosion of trade or by tip-offs from loyal customers.
103
 However, in other contexts the 
existence of steps that might be taken to limit the risk of detection may give the fiduciary cause for 
optimism. The fiduciary might exploit information asymmetries and limited monitoring to prevent an 
opportunity from ever appearing on the principal’s radar. Equally, fiduciaries might (and frequently 
do) exploit appropriated opportunities through corporate fronts to conceal their ownership. 
 
A fiduciary contemplating the receipt of a bribe or secret commission is particularly likely to 
underestimate the risk of detection. If, as we might expect,
104
 fiduciaries perceive bribe and 
commission taking as more prevalent than they are, they are likely to under-estimate the detection risk 
unless incidents of detection similarly are perceived as more numerous than they are. This will be 
unlikely. Indeed, the opposite may be true since the event of detection is unlikely to be readily 
available. The fiduciary’s control over relevant information and the ease with which illegitimate 
payments can be concealed is likely to make plausible scenarios of detection difficult to imagine. On 
the other hand, where the fiduciary previously has engaged in a similar activity (for instance the 
receipt of a small commission) and, as we might expect, escaped detection, salient instances of 
detection avoidance are easily called to mind. In such circumstances ‘I haven’t been caught’ easily 
                                                          
100 Lee Ross, David Greene & Pamela House, ‘The “False Consensus Effect”: An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and 
Attribution Processes’ (1977) 13 J Experimental Social Psychology 279; Gary Marks & Norman Miller, ‘Ten Years of 
Research on the False Consensus Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical Review’ (1987) 102 Psychological Bulletin 72. 
101 Those exhibiting the bias but who are not inclined to engage in an undesirable behaviour are likely to under-estimate the 
frequency with which others engage in the behaviour. The situation is more complex for those not inclined to undesirable 
behaviour who exhibit both false uniqueness and false consensus biases. It may be that the biases are off-setting, giving rise 
to relatively accurate perceptions: Cooter, Feldman & Feldman (n 94) 892, 905-907. Given we are concerned with 
fiduciaries contemplating breaching their fiduciary obligation it is not necessary to pursue this issue further. 
102 See Frankel (n 60); Cooter & Freedman (n 79); Larry Ribstein, ‘The Structure of the Fiduciary Relationship’ (January 4 
2003) U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No LE03-003 (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=397641); 
Robert Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law’ (2011) 91 BUL Rev 1039. 
103 As in Normalec Ltd v Britton [1983] FSR 318 (Ch) 321 (Walton J). 
104 See n 95 – n 97 and text. 
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translates to ‘I won’t be caught’.105 Moreover, fiduciaries contemplating bribe and commission taking 
are probable candidates for optimism bias because they are likely to perceive the risk of detection as 
highly controllable. It is in the common interest of both the fiduciary and briber (who also faces 
sanctions if caught) to cover their tracks, and it is largely within the power of both to do so. Payments 
of bribes and secret commissions are difficult for monitors to detect since harm to the enterprise with 
which the fiduciary is entrusted usually is ambiguous or invisible.
106
 Often, the bare fact of payment is 
the only indication of wrongdoing and this is the evidence that the wrongdoers control and have the 
power to conceal. 
 
 
(c) Implications of Low Risk Perception 
 
It follows we might expect fiduciaries to under-estimate the risk of detection, especially in relation to 
bribe and commission taking, and to perceive the risk as low. This has three implications for deterring 
disloyalty.  
 
First, to maintain the desired level of deterrence, it may be necessary to make adjustments to s to 
compensate for the fiduciary’s under-estimation of p. This suggests that exemplary damages may 
have a role to play in securing the desired level of deterrence, since they can be adjusted to 
compensate for low subjective detection and enforcement probabilities.
107
 One problem with this 
strategy, however, is that it assumes the effects of a low p can be off-set by increasing s. In fact, a low 
p may leave individuals relatively unresponsive to changes in s.
108
  
 
Secondly, particular problems arise if the perceived risk of detection falls to zero since at this point 
sanctions become irrelevant. Such an occurrence may be more common than is appreciated because of 
the way in which individuals process risk: small risks often are treated as ‘zero risk’ and simply 
ignored.
109
 Thus, it has been observed that individuals may aim to ‘get the gist’ of a risk, hence ‘edit’ 
small risks to zero.
110
 Others may use ‘probability thresholds’,111 ignoring the consequences of an 
event if the perceived probability of its occurrence falls below a subjectively determined threshold.
112
 
In one notable experiment over a quarter of subjects were unwilling to pay anything to insure against 
a 1% risk of loss while over 10% of subjects were unwilling to pay anything to protect against a 10% 
risk of loss,
113
 implying that such subjects ignored the risk of loss entirely. Such findings have clear 
                                                          
105 Colin Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, ‘Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications’ (1989) 8 J 
Policy Analysis & Management 565, 569. 
106 Consider, for example, the €10m commission in the FHR case (n 10). The principals were content with the €211.5m 
purchase price they paid for the hotel, presumably because the hotel was difficult to value and the price fell within a broadly 
acceptable range. This view changed once the commission was discovered, although the extent to which the price was 
loaded by the commission was unclear. A more modest illustration is Williams v Barton [1927] 2 Ch 9 (Ch), where the price 
paid by the trust for the stockbroker’s service was the usual market rate. 
107 See Anthony Duggan, ‘Exemplary Damages in Equity: A Law and Economics Perspective’ (2006) 26 OJLS 303. 
108 Daniel Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, ‘An Experimental Investigation of Deterrence: Cheating, Self-Serving Bias, and 
Impulsivity’ (2003) 41 Criminology 167. 
109 Camerer & Kunreuther, (n 105) 570. 
110 Eric Stone, Frank Yates & Andrew Parker, ‘Risk Communication: Absolute Versus Relative Expressions of Low-
Probability Risks’ (1994) 60 Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 387. Indeed, in some real world 
decision contexts people often do not seek information about the likelihood of an event, but prefer to base decisions on other 
factors: Oswald Huber, Roman Wider & Odilo Huber, ‘Active Information Search and Complete Information Presentation in 
Naturalistic Risky Decision Tasks’ (1997) 95 Acta Psychologica 15. 
111 Huber, Wider & Huber (n 110) 27 (finding that where a decision maker’s perceived control of variables is such that the 
probability of a negative event can be brought below a subjective threshold the risk becomes irrelevant); Paul Slovic and 
others, ‘Preferences for Insurance Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications’ (1977) 44 J Risk & Insurance 237 
(probability thresholds explain why individuals frequently fail to purchase insurance to protect against low probability high 
consequence events). 
112 This makes perfect sense: people face many risks in every aspect of their daily lives but can only worry about so many 
things. Equally, denial of small risks allows people to think about risk in absolute terms, satisfying the psychological desire 
for certainty: Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, ‘Rating the Risks’ in Theodore Glickman & Michael 
Gough (eds), Readings in Risk (Johns Hopkins University Press 1990) 61, 66. 
113 Gary McClelland, William Schulze & Don Coursey, ‘Insurance for Low-Probability Hazards: A Bimodal Response to 
Unlikely Events’ (1993) 7 J Risk & Uncertainty 95, 103 (Figure 2). 
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implications for the deterrence potential of the remedial regime for fiduciary disloyalty. A fiduciary 
who is perfectly informed about the remedial consequences of disloyalty will be unresponsive to those 
consequences if he perceives there is no chance they will have to be faced.
114
 
 
Finally, even if a low risk is not translated into zero risk, low risk perception is likely to have 
implications for a fiduciary’s incentive to become informed about the sanctions for disloyalty. The 
lower a fiduciary’s perceived risk that wrongdoing will be detected and the principal’s rights 
enforced, the less incentive there is for the fiduciary to expend the effort or to bear the cost of 
becoming informed about the legal consequences of disloyalty. Consequently, we might expect more 
costly or difficult-to-process information about the legal consequences of disloyalty to be ignored. 
This hypothesis and its implications, particularly for the deterrence value of proprietary claims, are 
explored in the following section. 
 
 
5. WHAT DO FIDUCIARIES KNOW? 
 
If the superior disgorgement potential of the constructive trust is to influence fiduciary behaviour then 
fiduciaries must know and understand the implications for them of proprietary disgorgement. The 
implicit assumption of the deterrence thesis is that the properties of the constructive trust are 
perceived and clearly understood by fiduciaries. But the foundation of this assumption is not clear. 
Economic models, which assume fiduciaries either are perfectly informed or gather optimal 
information given the resources at their disposal, might be applied. However, these models are 
unrealistic and generate scarcely credible predictions. A more realistic behavioural account of 
information gathering, on the other hand, suggests fiduciaries are unlikely to know much of the 
constructive trust or its implications, or will ignore them. 
 
 
(a) Are Fiduciaries Perfectly or Optimally Informed? 
 
Advocates of the deterrence thesis might assume fiduciaries are perfectly informed. On this view there 
is no difference between the objective properties of the constructive trust and fiduciaries’ perceptions 
of them. But since perfect knowledge rarely is attainable this assumption is grossly unrealistic.
115
 
Humans are not omniscient; information is costly and time-consuming to obtain, absorb and apply.
116
  
Economic models assuming perfect information thus occupy a ‘slum dwelling in the town of 
economics’.117 
 
Alternatively, advocates of the deterrence thesis might apply economic models of information search 
which accept that actors operate within constraints (of time, computational ability, money etc) but 
within those constraints they optimise.
118
 Accordingly, such constrained optimisers will calculate the 
costs and benefits of searching for each additional unit of information and stop searching at the point 
the cost of acquiring an additional unit of information exceeds the benefit.
119
  
 
                                                          
114 See n 169 – n 172 and text. 
115 Thus, individuals frequently know little of the law.  In general, lay people are ignorant of much of the law which is 
intended to regulate their conduct: see Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (1991) 144-
145; John Darley, Kevin Carlsmith & Paul Robinson, ‘The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law’ (2001) 35 Law & Soc 
Rev 165.  Professionals similarly are not immune from ignorance of laws addressed to them. For instance, despite heavy 
publicity drives in the sector, recent research shows a quarter of those working in the construction industry have no 
awareness of the Bribery Act 2010. In smaller organisations (employees<200) 50% have no awareness of the requirements 
of the legislation: Chartered Institute of Building, (n 95) 17. 
116 Gerd Gigerenzer, Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope with Uncertainty (OUP 2008) 4; Posner, Economic Analysis 
(n 24) §1.1.  
117 George Stigler, ‘The Economics of Information’ (1961) 69 J Pol Econ 213, 213. 
118 See, for example, Thomas Sargent, Bounded Rationality in Microeconomics (OUP 1993). 
119 Stigler (n 117); Sargent (n 118). 
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It is not, however, clear whether such models would predict a significant correlation between the 
objective properties of the constructive trust and fiduciaries’ perceptions of the remedy. Better 
information about sanctions allows more accurate calculation of the expected cost of disloyalty. But 
this is valuable to the fiduciary only to the extent the additional information leads to a different and 
improved outcome (e.g. the additional information leads to the selection of a ‘no-breach’ option rather 
than a ‘breach’ option because the information allows the fiduciary to calculate that the former option 
maximises subjective expected utility). The additional benefits flowing from the substantive decision, 
moreover, must be greater than the costs (including opportunity costs) incurred by the fiduciary 
allocating time and other resources to information search. Additionally, since the formal legal 
sanction is but one element of the overall sanction for disloyalty, and since the probability of being 
sanctioned may be low, the value of information about the legal consequences of disloyalty will be 
discounted accordingly. This suggests a rational fiduciary is perhaps less likely to seek out 
information about the remedial implications of disloyalty than proponents of the deterrence thesis 
assume. 
 
More importantly, optimal search probably is impossible. Optimising criteria, it has been pointed out, 
create ‘an infinite and seemingly intractable regress’.120 An individual seeking optimal information for 
the purpose of making a particular decision requires information about how much information he 
needs to collect, and if he is to collect optimal information about how much information he needs to 
collect he requires further information, and so on ad infinitum.
121
 It follows that optimal search is, 
arguably, logically impossible: the net value of information gathering is ‘unknown and rationally 
unknowable’.122 At any rate, optimal information search is impractical and unrealistic. In most 
contexts (including the present one) it is not possible for actors to estimate the value of an additional 
unit of information before it is known.
123
 Moreover, while optimal search theory assumes individuals 
are able to recognise the limits of their knowledge, in reality individuals tend to be poor at calibrating 
their own knowledge and understanding.
124
 To assume optimal search is possible thus invites the 
omniscient hyper-rational actor of early neo-classical economics to ‘sneak in through the back 
door’.125 
 
 
(b)  Realistic Limits to Fiduciary Knowledge 
 
In fact, the behavioural evidence suggests fiduciary knowledge is likely to be curtailed by the 
operation of biases and the adoption of non-optimising search strategies. Under such conditions, 
which are explored further below, fiduciaries contemplating disloyalty are much less likely to be 
cognizant of the properties of the constructive trust than proponents of the deterrence thesis assume.  
 
(a) Biases and Inadvertent Ignorance 
 
Information search may be limited by inadvertent ignorance. Psychological research suggests there is 
a general tendency for people to assume that things are simpler than they really are. Frequently, they 
fail to appreciate the existence of relevant information that they do not possess (‘unknown 
unknowns’) and they fail to appreciate their own lack of understanding of the information they do 
possess. For instance, people exhibit a strong tendency to overestimate their understanding of how 
                                                          
120 John Conlisk, ‘Why Bounded Rationality?’ (1996) 34 J Economic Literature 669, 687.  
121 See genrally Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge University Press 1983) 17-18; 
Philippe Mongin & Bernard Walliser, ‘Infinite Regressions in the Optimizing Theory of Decision’ in Bertrand Munier (ed), 
Risk, Decision and Rationality (Reidel 1987) 435; Conlisk (n 120) 686-688. 
122 Jon Elster, ‘Excessive Ambitions’ (2009) 4 Capitalism & Society, Article 1 (DOI: 10.2202/1932-0213.1055) 5. 
123 Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press 1989) 35; Jon Elster, ‘The Nature and 
Scope of Rational Choice Explanations’ in Michael Martin & Lee McIntyre (eds), Readings in the Philosophy of Social 
Science (MIT Press 1994) 311, 318.  
124 See n 126 – 133 and text. 
125 Gigerenzer, Todd & ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics (n 67) 11. 
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things work (the ‘illusion of explanatory depth’)126 and thereby lack awareness of the complexity of 
the world around them.
127
 Similarly, people generally are poor at evaluating, and therefore 
appreciating the limits of, their own knowledge and understanding, believing that comprehension of a 
given matter has been attained when in fact it has not.
128
 In experiments on text comprehension, for 
example, subjects asked to read simple expository texts expressed high confidence in their 
comprehension of the texts, but were unable to identify basic mistakes or contradictions
129
 or to make 
simple inferences from central propositions contained within the texts.
130
 This ‘illusion of knowing’ 
may persist even when novel or technical information is encountered,
131
 and it is exacerbated by the 
ease with which large amounts of information can be accessed through modern technology.
132
 The 
operation of such illusions may be compounded by the tendency of individuals to make overly 
optimistic assessments of their own abilities, competencies and personal characteristics.
133
 
 
It follows that in many situations there is a significant gap between what individuals believe they 
know and what they really do know. This has implications for information gathering: individuals who 
believe they are better informed than they really are will cease search and deliberation prematurely.  
 
 (ii) The ‘Satisficing’ Search Strategy 
 
When we search for information, it is said, ‘we satisfice, we do not maximise’.134  That is, we tend to 
be concerned not with a search for optimal information but with the identification of information that 
is satisfactory given our needs and circumstances. Thus, decision-makers identify a target or 
aspiration level of satisfaction and search until they find an alternative that reaches that level.
135
 
Aspiration levels are dynamic, not static; they vary with context and may be fine-tuned during search. 
Thus, in benign environments aspiration levels will rise; in challenging environments they will fall.
136
 
Since search is terminated when the individual identifies the first alternative that meets the 
satisfaction threshold, choice is determined in part by the order in which alternatives are evaluated.
137
  
 
In economics circles satisficing generally is viewed with scepticism, as an elusive ‘moving target’ 
with too little predictive value because an individual’s satisfaction level is determined subjectively.138  
                                                          
126 Leonid Rozenblit & Frank Keil, ‘The Misunderstood Limits of Folkscience: An Illusion of Explanatory Depth’ (2002) 26 
Cognitive Science 521; Frank Keil, ‘Folkscience: Coarse Interpretations of a Complex Reality’ (2003) 7 Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 368; Frank Keil, ‘Getting to the Truth: Grounding incomplete Knowledge’ (2008) 73 Brooklyn L Rev 1035. 
127 See, for example, Rebecca Lawson, ‘The Science of Cycology: Failure to Understand How Everyday Objects Work’ 
(2006) 34 Memory & Cognition 1667. 
128 Arthur Glenberg, Alex Wilkinson & William Epstein, ‘The Illusion of Knowing: Failure in the Self-Assessment of 
Comprehension’ (1982) 10 Memory & Cognition 597. For an overview of the experimental literature identifying the illusion, 
see Arthur Glenberg and others, ‘Enhancing Calibration of Comprehension’ (1987) 116 J Experimental Psychology: General 
119, 119-121. 
129 Glenberg, Wilkinson & Epstein, ‘The Illusion of Knowing’ (n 128); William Epstein, Arthur Glenberg & Margaret 
Bradley, ‘Coactivation and Comprehension: Contribution of Text Variables to Illusion of Knowing’ (1984) 12 Memory & 
Cognition 355. 
130 Arthur Glenberg & William Epstein, ‘Calibration of Comprehension’ (1985) 11 J Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory & Cognition 702. 
131 Arthur Glenberg & William Epstein, ‘Inexpert Calibration of Comprehension’ (1987) 15 Memory & Cognition 84. See 
also Regina Jucks & Elisabeth Paus, ‘What Makes a Word Difficult? Insights into the Mental Representation of Techical 
Terms’ (2012) 7 Metacognition & Learning 91. 
132 Matthew Fisher, Mariel Goddu & Frank Keil, ‘Searching for Explanations: How the Internet Inflates Estimates of Internal 
Knowledge’ (2015) 144 J Experimental Psychology: General 674. 
133 See Mark Alicke & Olesya Govorun, ‘The Better-Than-Average Effect’ in Mark Alicke, David Dunning & Joachim 
Kruger (eds), The Self in Social Judgment (Taylor & Francis/Psychology Press 2005) 85. 
134 Russell Harding, Morality and the Limits of Reason (1990) 4. See also, James Bowen & Zi-Lei Qiu, ‘Satisficing When 
Buying Information’ (1992) 51 Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 471; Andrew Caplan, Mark Dean & 
Daniel Martin, ‘Search and Satisficing’ (2011) 101 Am Econ Rev 2899. 
135 Herbert A Simon, ‘Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment’ (1956) 63 Psychological Review 129, 136; 
Simon, ‘Behavioral Model’ (n 64). See also William Baumol, ‘On Rational Satisficing’ in Mie Augier & James March (eds), 
Models of a Man: Essays in Memory of Herbert A Simon (MIT Press 2004) 57. 
136 Herbert A Simon, ‘Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations’ (1979) 69 Am Econ Rev 493, 503. 
137 John Payne, James Bettman & Eric Johnson, The Adaptive Decision Maker (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 26. 
138 Foka-Kavalieraki & Hatzis (n 73) 23. 
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However, the environmental features of, and psychological processes triggered by, an individual’s 
situation may permit broad predictions about likely satisfaction thresholds and search outcomes. 
Satisficing may be unable to provide the clear, elegant and precise predictions favoured by 
economists; but sometimes it is better to be ‘messy and vaguely right’ than ‘elegant and precisely 
wrong’.139   
 
(iii) The Fiduciary’s Search 
 
We can now revisit the question ‘what is a fiduciary contemplating disloyalty likely to know of the 
legal implications of his intended disloyal act?’ For the reasons offered below, the answer in most 
cases is likely to be ‘very little’. 
 
Initial aspiration levels: A number of factors suggest initial aspiration levels may be be modest: (1) 
fiduciaries have limited time to search; (2) obtaining legal advice about the implications of an 
intended breach is likely to be financially expensive; (3) if fiduciaries perceive there is little or no risk 
their contemplated disloyalty will be detected and sanctioned, information about the legal implications 
of breach will be perceived as being of limited value; (4) the formal legal sanction may not loom as 
large in the mind of the fiduciary as other elements of the sanction. In particular, the risk of being 
compelled to give-up future gain is unlikely to be as psychologically proximate as the loss of an 
existing endowment (for instance, loss of reputation, loss of position by termination of the 
relationship, or loss of liberty);
140
 (5) the fiduciary is likely to (a) appreciate that the law may be 
complex and that he lacks the requisite skills to access and to understand much legal information; or 
(b) believe the law is simpler than it is and therefore set out to find a clear but simple answer. 
 
The search environment: The search environment is relatively inhospitable to a fiduciary embarking 
upon a quest for information about the proprietary implications of a breach of fiduciary obligation. 
Short of buying tailored legal advice from an expert, which is likely to be relatively expensive, 
fiduciaries seeking to understand the legal implications of a contemplated breach of duty may adopt a 
number of strategies. First, they may identify and search a relevant legal source such as a textbook or 
legal encyclopaedia. This strategy is likely to yield the most accurate and reliable information but 
such sources are not easily comprehended by non-lawyers. 
 
Secondly, if available, the fiduciary might consult general guidance produced by an information 
intermediary. Guidance provided by information intermediaries will be more accessible but, for 
reasons which are explored further below,
141
 is likely to omit consideration of the proprietary 
implications of breach of fiduciary obligation.  
 
Thirdly, the fiduciary may undertake a general web search for relevant material. In principle, the 
world wide web offers quick and low cost access to a vast information repository. However, finding 
appropriate information may be difficult and time consuming. Search engines are key but typically 
result in an ‘information flood’.142 It follows that a systematic review of search engine results pages 
(SERPs) is likely to be prohibitive in terms of time and cognitive effort. Users are more likely to 
select which links to follow by relying on heuristic processes which focus on a limited range of 
information. Such processes are quick but can lead to poor evaluation and selection outcomes due to 
the limited information focus.
143
 For example, users often focus selectively on key words in the 
                                                          
139 Richard Thaler, The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life (Princeton University Press 1994) 198.  
140 This is the result of the so-called ‘endowment effect: people value things that are already part of their endowment more 
highly than things that they may acquire but which are not yet part of their endowment: see Thaler, ‘Misbehaving’ (n 62) Ch 
2. 
141 See n 159 – n 164 and text. 
142 Soo-Young Rieh, Yong-Mi Kim & Karen Markey, ‘Amount of Invested Mental Effort (AIME) in Online Searching’ 
(2012) 48 Information Processing & Management 1136. 
143 Miriam Metzger, Andrew Flanagin & Ryan Medders, ‘Social and Heuristic Approaches to Credibility Evaluation Online’ 
(2010) 60 Journal of Communication 413. 
 19 
 
highlighted link for each result or on information which is consistent with expectations.
144
 Perhaps 
most importantly, users also tend to rely heavily on SERP rankings, paying greatest attention to the 
results at the top of the first SERP and rarely moving to the second SERP or beyond.
145
 Since search 
engines rank pages by reference to the relevance of a page to the search terms and by quality,
146
 the 
highest ranked pages (which are most likely to be selected) will not necessarily be the most 
accessible.  
 
Much will depend on the adequacy of the search terms employed. Searching a technical field without 
a technical vocabulary may prove difficult. In the context of corrupt payments, for example, a 
fiduciary who searches for ‘bribery’, ‘receipt of bribe’, ‘agent receiving bribe’ and ‘corrupt payment’ 
will be faced with a SERP displaying links relating mostly to the definition of bribery and criminal 
liability.
147
 By contrast, the first SERP for ‘bribes and secret commissions’ contains numerous links to 
pages discussing the availability of proprietary claims, although the content of the linked pages – 
predominantly academic articles
148
 and update notes written by solicitors – is not particularly 
accessible to lay readers. Moreover, reference to the implications of proprietary claims (namely, 
tracing and following) is limited to one or two lines tucked away towards the end of the pages, with 
little or no explanation of the terminology. Whether such discussion would be noticed by most (non-
legally trained) readers,
149
 let alone its significance appreciated, is doubtful.
150
 
 
Stopping search: Faced with such an environment, fiduciaries in general cannot be expected to 
cognize the implications of the constructive trust. Recall choice is influenced by the order in which 
alternatives are evaluated. In addition to possessing some rudimentary understanding of their basic 
                                                          
144 Metzger, Flanagin & Medders, ‘Social and Heuristic Approaches’ (n 143). 
145 Bing Pan and others, ‘In Google We trust: Users’ Decisions on Rank, Position, and Relevance’ (2007) 12 Journal of 
Computer Mediated Communication 801 (finding rank is a better predictor of link selection than the relevance of the link, 
with most attention given to the top of the first search page). See also Mark Keane, Maeve O’Brien & Barry Smyth, ‘Are 
People Biased in Their Use of Search Engines?’ (2008) 51 Communications of the ACM 49; Yvonne Kammerer & Peter 
Gerjets, ‘The Role of Search Result Position and Source Trustworthiness in the Selection of Web Search Results When 
Using a List or a Grid Interface’ (2014) 30 International Journal of Human-Computer interaction 177 (Study 1); Patricia 
Wallace, The Psychology of The Internet (Cambridge University Press 2nd edn 2016) 7 (noting that the first page of results is 
‘about as far as most people ever look’). 
146 Wallace, Psychology (n 145) 7-8. 
147 In other contexts, such as the appropriation of a business opportunity, the most obvious search terms (e.g. ‘business 
opportunity’, ‘taking a business opportunity’, ‘appropriation of business opportunity’ or ‘misappropriation of business 
opportunity’) return either nothing of legal relevance or pages discussing liability and the corporate opportunities doctrine 
(searches conducted on Google on 7 March 2018). 
148 E.g. Lord Millett, ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions’ (n 1). 
149 Accessing material via the internet tends to make people more cursory and inattentive readers: see Harald Weinreich and 
others, ‘Not Quite the Average: An Empirical Study of Web Use’ (2008) 2 ACM Transactions on the Web, Article 5, 18-20 
(DOI=10.1145/1326566).  
150 The reviewer of this article, for example, suggested searchers may soon find themselves on Wikipedia. The second result 
for the Wikipedia search ‘bribes and secret commissions’ links to a page on the FHR case, which notes that a proprietary 
claim ‘will allow tracing into the assets of the agent and any relevant third parties in order to claim any fruits of the fraud’: 
‘FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners LLC’ 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FHR_European_Ventures_LLP_v_Cedar_Capital_Partners_LLC> (Accessed 7 March 2018). 
This, the reviewer suggests, surely is a red flag indicating to the fiduciary that asset shielding through the use of a shell 
company or other third party will not do. But (1) what is clearly visible to lawyers who know what they are looking for and 
find what they expect to find is not necessarily visible to those untrained in the art who are unsure of what they are looking 
for. (2) Different search terms lead to different results; search terms that are most obvious to those with knowledge of the 
field will not necessarily be employed by those with little or no knowledge of the field. We must be wary of the ‘curse of 
knowledge’ – the cognitive bias which makes it difficult for us to imagine that others do not share the same knowledge or 
apply it in the same way as we do: see Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein & Mark Weber, ‘The Curse of Knowledge in 
Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis’ (1989) 97 J Pol Econ 1232;  Richard H Thaler, ‘From Homo Economicus to 
Homo Sapiens’ (2000) 14 Joumal of Economic Perspectives 133, 133-134. (3)  Recall too that in deciding whether to follow 
a link users tend to focus on key words in the link (see n 144 and text). A linked case name is perhaps much less likely to be 
followed than a link containing terms that are more salient to a non-lawyer. (4) A fiduciary who follows the link will need to 
navigate over 3,000 words of relatively technical text before the pertinent line of text is reached. One suspects most will 
have given up by this stage or skim over the relevant text given the cursory attention often paid to web pages: see Weinreich 
and others, ‘Not Quite the Average’ (n 149). 
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duty not to profit from their position,
151
 during their search for information fiduciaries likely will view 
statements to the effect that a fiduciary is liable to ‘account for’, ‘disgorge’ or ‘give-up’ disloyal gain. 
Such statements often are accompanied by statements of the immateriality of good faith, impossibility 
arguments and harm to the principal. These statements encapsulate the fundamental principle that 
fiduciaries must not make unauthorised gain; if they do they must give it up. This notion, moreover, is 
consistent with the general legal and moral principle, which may have been acquired through social 
learning, that one ought not to be permitted to profit from one’s own wrongdoing.  
 
It must be questionable whether a fiduciary possessing such information would consider further 
search beneficial since the legal consequences of breach appear to be clearly known (this is especially 
so where the fiduciary expects to find a simple legal answer). In the absence of actual knowledge 
about the peculiar and potentially far-reaching consequences of proprietary claims the possibility of 
such consequences will be difficult to imagine (they are ‘unknown unknowns’).152 That would involve 
asking questions such as how one would give up one’s gains and what would be the implications if 
the initial gain was exchanged, mixed in bank accounts, invested or passed to third parties. Such 
questions involve additional, more complex, levels of inquiry that evidence and experience tells us 
people are not very good at making.
153
 
 
Similarly, search may be stopped where a fiduciary perceives his contemplated action will attract 
criminal sanctions.
154
 Here, the deterrence work is likely to be done (if at all) by the criminal law: if, 
as we might expect, the fiduciary is deflected from the contemplated act by the threat of criminal 
sanction further search for information on the legal implications of the act is unnecessary. If, on the 
other hand, the fiduciary is not moved by the threat of criminal sanction, arguably the private law 
implications of his actions will be of little interest or exert little influence on his behaviour.
155
 
 
What of fiduciaries whose searches disclose that disloyal gain is held ‘on constructive trust’? Such 
terminology is unhelpful to those unskilled in the art so further information is necessary. This may 
cause fiduciaries to: (1) accept ignorance of the term and satisfice with a basic understanding of 
disgorgement; (2) attribute meaning to the term, for instance by equating it with the fiduciary’s own 
subjective notion of disgorgement or otherwise by ‘filling in the gaps’ by reference to existing 
knowledge;
156
 or (3) search for further explanation. The first option will leave the fiduciary with a 
basic understanding of the disgorgement principle; the second option is unlikely to take things much 
further. Additional search is likely to be time consuming. Explanations of the concept of a ‘trust’ will 
generate new terms and concepts such as ‘tracing’ and ‘following’, giving rise to the same three 
options, and so on until a satisfactory understanding is obtained. In many cases we might expect the 
time and cognitive costs of such a comprehensive search to be prohibitive given the likely modesty of 
the initial aspiration levels. 
 
Adjustment of aspirations: A final and related point is that the information environment perhaps is 
more likely to lead to a downward adjustment of an initially high satisfaction threshold than to an 
uplift of an initially low satisfaction threshold. As is evident from the above discussion, an individual 
                                                          
151 Most fiduciaries aim to comply with their duties, at least initially, therefore must be cognizant of the basic demands of 
their office. 
152 See n 126 – n 133 and text. 
153 Richard Thaler, ‘Homo Economicus’ (n 150), 134-135; Rosenblit & Keil, ‘Misunderstood Limits’ (n 126) 523 
(discussing how people conflate higher level general analysis of a system, or functional glosses, with lower level detailed 
analysis). 
154 See the results of the searches discussed above, n 147 and text. 
155 Craig Rotherham, ‘Deterrence as a Justification for Awarding Accounts of Profits’ (2012) 32 OJLS 537, 550-552. 
156 It is, in fact, more common than we may imagine for people to over-estimate their comprehension of technical and 
unfamiliar terms: see Jucks & Paus (n 131). It is initially puzzling why a person who encounters a novel term of art would be 
overly confident about their understanding of the term. One possibility is that meaning is inferred from the context in which 
the term is used or a familiar meaning is attributed, causing the individual to under-estimate the complexity beneath its 
lexical surface. This explanation is consistent with theories suggesting feelings of knowledge are elicited by cue familiarity 
or the ease of access of information prompted by the cue: Asher Koriat & Ravit Levy-Sadot, ‘The Combined Contribution of 
the Cue-Familiarity and Accessibility Heuristics to Feelings of Knowledge’ (2001) 27 J Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory & Cognition 34. 
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seeking a clear understanding of the properties of constructive trust does not face a benign search 
environment. Information is complex, voluminous and dispersed, there is likely a dearth of accessible 
accounts provided by information intermediaries, and fiduciaries generally are not skilled in the 
relevant art, hence will find legal information difficult and time consuming to navigate and to 
understand. Furthermore, the more effortful it is to process information, the more likely it will be 
simplified or ignored altogether to avoid ‘cognitive overload’.157 This process may not be entirely 
conscious but a part automatic response to negative affect generated by excessive cognitive load.
158
 
Since negative affect is generated by cognitive load and is unrelated to the significance of the 
information, there may be downward adjustment of aspiration levels even where information is 
available and highly relevant. 
 
 
(c) Information Intermediaries 
 
Frequently, third parties mediate the communication of information to information users, providing 
information specifically tailored to the users’ needs. We might expect professional bodies, regulators 
and employers to provide appropriately tailored legal information for fiduciaries by way of guidance 
notes, handbooks or codes of practice.
159
  Targeted information of this kind may limit inadvertent 
ignorance by making relevant information more visible and increase a satisficer’s satisfaction 
threshold by creating a more benign information environment. However, information provided by 
intermediaries necessarily is limited by two factors. 
 
(i) The Accuracy/Accessibility Trade-Off 
 
First, the information must be selected and packaged to meet the needs of the information user. In the 
present context, the information must be accessible to a predominantly non-legally trained audience at 
a low enough cost. Reducing complex legal information to concise, relatively simple formulations 
involves a trade-off between accuracy and accessibility. A complete and accurate account of the 
implications of a breach of fiduciary obligation necessarily would be detailed and lengthy, hence 
costly to access and difficult to understand. We therefore might expect intermediaries to provide 
simplified statements of broad principle that are accessible at lower cost, such as a clear statement of 
the disgorgement principle indicating fiduciaries will be required to give-up any benefit derived from 
a breach of fiduciary obligation, but omitting more complicated aspects such as how the gain will be 
identified/quantified.
160
  This would be accessible and convey the basic message that proponents of 
the deterrence rationale would like to see conveyed: ‘breach and the law removes your gain’.  
 
However, this says nothing about apparently key deterrent aspects of proprietary claims such as the 
recourse to third parties that the constructive trust provides. Further, the function of an account of 
profits tends to be described in remarkably similar terms.
161
 While lawyers make sharp crystalline 
distinctions between personal and proprietary disgorgement, inevitably the boundaries blur in the 
process of communication to lay persons. The need to trade accuracy for accessibility, in the end, 
probably will result in the communication to fiduciaries of a broadly similar ‘end message’ regardless 
of the availability of proprietary claims. 
 
                                                          
157 Melvin Eisenberg, ‘Text Anxiety’ (1986) 59 S Cal L Rev 305. 
158 Ellen Garbarino & Julie Edell, ‘Cognitive Effort, Affect, and Choice’ (1997) 24 J Consumer Research 147. 
159 We might also imagine official, authoritative communications of legal information, such as official pamphlets or 
accessible, plain language statutory statements. For discussion of these and similar ‘official’ options, see Law Commission, 
Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties (CP 153, 1999) paras 14.8-
14.40.  
160 Such an approach was considered the most appropriate by the Company Law Review Steering Group in its consideration 
of a possible statutory statement of remedies for breach of directors’ duties: Sarah Worthington, ‘Reforming Directors’ 
Duties’ (2001) 64 MLR 439, 457. 
161 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 (HL) 262 (Lord Keith); United Pan Europe (n 38) 
[47] (Morritt LJ) (‘it is not in doubt that the object of the equitable remedies of an account or the imposition of a constructive 
trust is to ensure that the defaulting fiduciary does not retain the profit’). 
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(ii) Limited Demand for Remedy Law 
 
The second limitation regarding information provided by intermediaries relates to the low demand for 
information about remedies. Most fiduciaries aim to comply with their legal duties.  Thus, 
understanding the content of their duties is more important than understanding the legal consequences 
of failing to comply with them.
162
 In other words, for most fiduciaries, ‘duty law’ is highly relevant 
while ‘remedy law’ is not. This is important since the supply of non-relevant information increases 
the cost of observing relevant information by increasing total information processing costs.
163
 While 
the supply of remedy law would reduce the search costs of the small number for whom it is salient 
(predominantly those contemplating breach), it would increase the cost of access for those seeking 
duty law. The cost may be minimal if remedy law is dealt with in broad, summary fashion. But we 
have noted already how this is unlikely to convey to fiduciaries the important properties of the 
constructive trust. In practice, we find limited supply of remedy law in information products for 
fiduciaries, still less consideration of the implications of proprietary disgorgement.
164
 
 
 
(d) Big Breaches and Well Informed Fiduciaries 
 
None of this is to suggest that fiduciaries never will be well informed of the legal (including 
proprietary) consequences of disloyalty. Indeed, in some contexts fiduciaries may possess a strong 
incentive to incur the costs of taking tailored legal advice or engaging in careful and thorough search. 
For example, fiduciaries who engage in large but infrequent breaches, or who plan ‘one big breach’, 
can be expected to be more motivated to become informed:
165
 the stakes are higher and such 
fiduciaries may lack the excessive optimism of avoiding detection that small repeat wrongdoers can 
be expected to exhibit.
166
  Nevertheless, fiduciaries who are well informed about the proprietary 
consequences of acquisitive breaches of fiduciary obligation are likely to be the exception, not the 
norm. Furthermore, there are good reasons to suspect that even well informed fiduciaries may not be 
deterred by proprietary disgorgement any more than they would be by disgorgement effected by 
personal remedy. 
 
First, an accurate understanding of proprietary disgorgement may be a double edged sword: 
proprietary disgorgement may enhance profit stripping but its limitations can be exploited. For 
instance, an initial gain can be applied to generate subsequent wealth without leaving a transactional 
trail or identifiable assets, allowing the sophisticated fiduciary to defeat tracing rules and to avoid 
accountability for secondary profits.
167
 As Dale Oesterle noted long ago, rather than dissuade 
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laundering attempts: see Federal Republic of Brazil v Durant International Corporation [2015] UKPC 35, [2015] 3 WLR 
599 [38]-[41] (Toulson JSC); Relfo Limited (in liquidation) v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360, [2015] 1 BCLC 14 [56], [62]-
[63] (Arden LJ). Defeating tracing, particularly where the amount of money involved is significant, therefore will be 
difficult.  
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wrongdoing transactional link tracing is more likely to influence how knowledgeable wrongdoers 
transact after the commission of a wrong.
 168
 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, if the constructive trust is to operate as an effective 
deterrent, it is not only necessary for fiduciaries to perceive its properties but also to view those 
properties as relevant to a decision whether or not to breach. However, as has been explained already, 
excessive optimism about the prospects of avoiding detection, or avoiding the effects of particular 
sanctions, may render those sanctions behaviourally otiose.
169
 Since well informed fiduciaries are, by 
their very nature, more likely to be aware of the steps that can be taken to avoid detection and of the 
sophisticated laundering techniques that can be employed to obscure the trail of proceeds, they are 
likely candidates for over-optimism.
170
 Optimism about avoiding sanction is also likely to be fostered 
by highly available instances of the non-detection of wrongdoing – as where a fiduciary previously 
has engaged in a breach of duty without being caught.
171
 Instances of an isolated but very large breach 
of duty are likely to be relatively uncommon. Rather, more serious or significant forms of wrongdoing 
tend to emerge incrementally. Small transgressions often lead to larger transgressions, but few 
wrongdoers ever start with the large transgressions.
172
 If this dominant account of how wrongdoing 
develops is correct, we might expect large acquisitive breaches of fiduciary obligation to be preceded, 
in general, by small breaches, thereby fostering excessive optimism by providing readily available 
instances of non-detection. 
 
Finally, in the context of corrupt payments, fiduciaries who are well informed of the legal 
implications of their actions likely will appreciate the possibility of facing criminal sanctions if 
caught. A fiduciary who is not dissuaded by the possibility of criminal sanctions (including fines, 
imprisonment and confiscation measures) is unlikely to be influenced by civil law remedies.
173
 In 
such circumstances the deterrent role of the constructive trust is redundant. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The deterrence thesis initially appears as compelling as it is simple: a constructive trust can be 
expected to remove more of the fiduciary’s gain than an account of profits therefore fiduciaries will 
have less incentive to behave disloyally.  However, the deterrence thesis rests on unrealistic 
assumptions about fiduciary behaviour. Applying more nuanced behavioural tools, we find that the 
influence of proprietary disgorgement on fiduciary behaviour is likely to be negligible. Fiduciaries 
cannot be influenced by sanctions they do not know, and few fiduciaries will be cognizant of the 
properties of the constructive trust. Those who are may be relatively unresponsive to such properties 
because they perceive a low risk of detection. We might wonder whether the prospect of such 
negligible deterrence gains is sufficient, particularly given the potential impact of constructive trusts 
on innocent third parties.
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Ironically, the deterrence prospects of the constructive trust are bleakest in cases of bribe and 
commission taking, the contexts in which calls for the recognition of a constructive trust on deterrence 
grounds have been at their loudest. Detection rates for bribery and commission taking are particularly 
likely to be perceived as low, leaving fiduciaries with little incentive to become informed about 
sanctions and unresponsive to known sanctions.  
 
For the avoidance of doubt, the claim is not that disgorgement does not play an important role in 
dissuading disloyalty. Most fiduciaries can be expected to be cognizant of the basic idea of 
disgorgement, although it may have little or no impact on the decisions of those who perceive a very 
low or zero risk that their disloyalty will be detected. The claim is that employing the constructive 
trust to effect disgorgement is unlikely to have a material effect on most fiduciary behaviour because 
fiduciaries cannot generally be expected to understand the legal consequences of disloyalty at the 
requisite level of detail and complexity. Since the same general disgorgement ‘end message’ is likely 
to reach fiduciaries regardless of whether an account of profits or constructive trust is adopted to 
effect disgorgement the former is preferable given it is less disruptive to third parties.  
 
 
